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Abstract 
 
Following Cooper et al (CGH) 2004 we test whether market states are relevant for 
predicting UK momentum profits. However, rather than simply categorising up/down 
markets based on actual prices as CGH, we suggest investors may view expectations 
and/or sentiment as important. Contrary to the findings for the US, we find that 
momentum returns are not related to CGH-defined market states. Similar findings hold 
for an expectations-based split. In contrast, for the whole sample period, construction 
and retail sentiment indicators explain differences in momentum profits. However, 
robustness tests suggest their explanatory power is driven by the post-subprime crisis 
period.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Titman (henceforth JT) (1993), 
considerable attention has been devoted both to the identification of momentum profits 
and to explanations as to why such profits may exist. JT (1993) demonstrate that stock 
returns exhibit momentum over medium horizons, such that a zero investment strategy 
involving shorting past recent (six-month) losers and buying past recent (six-month) 
winners generates excess returns of the order of 1% per month in the following six-
month period. Subsequent work has demonstrated similar findings over a range of 
markets, with extensive evidence of momentum over short-to-medium horizons, ranging 
from 3 to 12 months.1 The evidence suggests that momentum abnormal returns are 
now a stylized fact and cannot be attributed to data mining. As a result, several papers 
have sought to explain the existence of momentum returns either arguing that such 
returns are a compensation for risk (see, for example, Conrad and Kaul, 1998) or by 
using a behavioural model based on inherent biases on the part of some investors (see, 
for example, Daniel et al, 1998; Barberis et al, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999).  
 
In this paper we concentrate on the behavioural approach to explaining momentum 
profits, since recent evidence is more consistent with this view (see for example JT, 
2001; Hvidkjaer, 2006; Asem, 2009; Chui et al, 2010) and in particular on one important 
aspect of the recent literature which argues that momentum profits are related to the 
prior state of the market. Specifically, consideration will be given to the approach 
adopted by Cooper et al (2004, hereafter CGH), which examines whether the 
profitability of momentum strategies differs depending on whether the market as a 
                                                 
1
 For example, Rouwenhorst (1998) finds similar results to JT (1993) for 12 European countries over the 
period 1980 to 1995; Hart et al (2003) find similar results to JT in examining 32 emerging markets; Griffin 
et al (2003) examine 40 markets including the US and find that macroeconomic risks do not explain 
findings; Galariotis et al (2007) find similar evidence for the UK stock market; Chui et al (2010) consider 
the role of cross cultural differences in momentum profits and find momentum profits in 37 of the 41 
countries included in their sample; Gupta et al. (2010) using data for 51 countries and including more than 
51,000 stocks find momentum profits using the conventional momentum strategy and using industrial and 
52-week high momentum strategies; and Badreddine et al (2012) find that while transactions costs are 
important, once these are taken into account even for (highly liquid) UK optioned stocks, momentum 
profits persist for some strategies.  
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whole was ‘up’ or ‘down’ in the period prior to the momentum portfolio holding period. 
However, unlike CGH, we not only examine the extent to which momentum profits are 
affected by whether the market has gone up or down, but also whether it has gone up or 
down relative to expectations. In addition, contrary to the CGH arguments that 
momentum performance is conditional only on past market states, we further test 
whether investor sentiment is relevant by using a range of sentiment measures. Given 
the arguments that sentiment is highly relevant in financial markets (see, for example, 
Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Barberis et al, 1998; Barber et al, 2009) this is an 
important consideration for this most robust of anomalies. 
 
CGH draw on the behavioural theories of Daniel et al (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) 
to argue that there will be greater short-run momentum following market increases than 
following market decreases. The empirical evidence presented by CGH supports their 
argument, with short-run momentum profits exclusively following up-markets over the 
period 1929-1995 for the US market.2 Thus they argue “consistent with Daniel et al 
(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999), the state of the market is critically important to the 
profitability of momentum strategies” (CGH, 2004, p1347). More specifically, they argue 
that as in Daniel et al (1998), aggregate overconfidence will be greater following an up-
market, and that if, as supported by Hong and Stein (1999), decreasing risk aversion 
leads to greater momentum profits, then, if risk aversion and wealth are inversely 
related, momentum profits will be higher following an up-market than following a down-
market. The state of the market has also been shown to be of importance in other 
areas. For example, Rosen (2006) argues that investors may be overly optimistic in ‘hot 
markets’. He provides evidence of merger momentum and shows that bidder stock 
prices have a greater tendency to increase when the stock market is doing better: 
“mergers announced during hot stock markets tend to get a better reaction from the 
                                                 
2
 Results are presented for mean returns, a CAPM model and a Fama-French 3 factor (FF3F) model. The 
main results presented in the paper are based on the state of the market in the three-year period prior to 
holding the momentum portfolio. They also present results based on the state of the market over a one-
year and a two-year period prior to holding the portfolio. The only case where there is evidence of 
momentum profits during a down-market is for the FF3F model using the one-year definition of the state 
of the market. 
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market than those announced in a cold market” (Rosen, 2006, p1013). Similarly, there 
is evidence of over-optimism in hot IPO markets (see, for example, Helwege and Liang, 
1996) and Holmes et al (2013) find that herding is more evident during periods when 
returns are low, compared to periods when returns are high. 
 
Thus, there is considerable evidence to support the view that the recent performance of 
the market affects the magnitude (or, indeed, existence) of profits in relation to various 
market phenomena. In light of this, the extent to which momentum profits are affected 
by market states is clearly worthy of investigation in a market other than the US. In this 
paper we examine the issue for the UK market.3 However, the CGH classification of the 
previous market state as either an ‘up-market’ or a ‘down-market’ may not be the most 
appropriate method by which to analyse the issue of the impact of aggregate market 
overconfidence. The approach taken by CGH only compares the actual market price at 
the beginning of the holding period, time t, with the actual market price at an earlier 
date, t-i, where i takes on the value of 12, 24 or 36 months. If the market price at time t 
(MPt) is greater than MPt-i, then the market is said to be up. In contrast, if MPt is less 
than MPt-i then the market is said to be down.
4 However, expectations and anchoring 
play an important role in finance and, particularly, in the behavioural finance literature.5 
In a market in which investors are rewarded for risk-taking (whatever the return 
generating process) the expectation at time t-i is that MPt will be greater than MPt-i, i.e. 
                                                 
3
 The London Stock Exchange is chosen for analysis in this paper for a number of reasons. First, it is one 
of the largest exchanges in the world in terms of market capitalization, trading value and number of trades 
(see http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics); second it is the most international of stock exchanges 
(see http://www.londoncapitalventures.com/) and; third, it is a market where momentum profits have been 
evident in a number of studies (see, for example, Liu et al (1999), Hon and Tonks (2003) and relevant 
references in footnote 1). Investigation of the issues for this market will be of interest to a wide range of 
investors, both domestic and overseas. 
4
 CGH also consider the market state as a continuous variable and find a non-linear relationship exists. 
However, the results from the use of a continuous variable for market state show a positive relationship 
between momentum profits and lagged market returns. 
5
 Anchoring refers to the tendency when making estimates to start at an initial value (the anchor point) 
and adjust away from that point. In many situations, different initial values lead to individuals making 
different final estimates. See Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
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by investing in a risky portfolio a positive return will be earned.6 Despite this, 
expectations have no role in the CGH approach: they simply compare actual prices at 
two points in time. Rather than comparing the actual market price at two points of time, 
from both a rational and a behavioural perspective it is more relevant to compare the 
actual market price at the beginning of the holding period, t, with the expectation at time 
t-i of what the market price will be at time t. 
 
This view is consistent with the notion of disappointment aversion as proposed by Gul 
(1991). Disappointment aversion is based on the idea that individuals have a reference 
point which evolves endogenously. As Fielding and Stracca (2007) state “Reflecting the 
idea that pain is more urgent than pleasure, the disappointment related to outcomes 
below expectations is assumed (and normally found) to be stronger than the elation 
related to outcomes exceeding expectations.” (p251, emphasis added).7 If expectations 
are important, then a comparison should be made between MPt and E(MPt,t-i), where 
the latter is the value that the market price is expected to have at time t, with the 
expectation formed at time t-i. To illustrate why this distinction might be important, 
consider the following situation:  
E(MPt,t-i) > MPt > MPt-i  (1) 
Here the price at the beginning of the holding period is greater than the actual price at 
time t-i, but is less than the value expected at time t-i for MP at time t. In these 
circumstances, investors may view the market as being ‘down’ (relative to expectations) 
even though the price of the market has risen over the period t-i to t. Consequently, to 
the extent that the prior market state and associated aggregate market confidence 
affects momentum profits as suggested by CGH, it is possible that the up/down split 
they use may not be accurately capturing investors’ perceptions of the market state. A 
priori it is not possible to determine whether changes in actual prices or deviations from 
expectations are more important. It is possible that investors are relatively naïve and 
                                                 
6
 This is consistent with the findings of CGH. In their sample more than 84% of periods are classified as 
UP using a 36 month lag and over 72% are UP when using a 12 month lag. 
7
 Fielding and Stracca (2007) examine behavioural explanations of the equity premium puzzle and 
suggest that a combination of myopic loss aversion and disappointment aversion provide “an attractive 
explanation of the equity premium puzzle” (p252). 
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that the comparison of actual prices at times t and t-i may be more important than the 
comparison of MPt and E(MPt,t-i). However, it is equally the case that trading strategies 
may be based more on variations from expectations, in which case a comparison of the 
actual and expected prices would be more relevant. Ultimately, it is an empirical issue 
as to which, if any, comparison is more relevant, one of the central issues that this 
paper seeks to address. 
 
In addition to the specific case of expected future values being of potential importance, 
it is also possible that more general measures of investor sentiment might impact on 
momentum profits. We, therefore, examine the relationship between sentiment and 
momentum profits in the UK market as a second central issue in the paper, using a 
range of sentiment measures.8 It is, of course, difficult to measure market expectations 
and levels of overconfidence or sentiment for all values of t. In this paper we employ 
different approaches for determining aggregate expectations and market sentiment. 
First, we use a direct measure of market expectations, in the form of stock index futures 
prices. The price of a stock index future at time t-i provides a means by which a market 
determined expectation can be established for specific values of the index at time t. 
Thus, the futures price provides a direct measure of E(MPt,t-i). The second approach 
does not provide us with a direct measure of E(MPt,t-i), but rather seeks to measure 
changes in market sentiment at different points in time, since investors seem to believe 
in sentiment (Brown and Cliff, 2004) and sentiment is relevant to a range of other issues 
in financial markets (for example: asset pricing (Baker and Wurgler, 2006); the value 
effect (Frazzini and Lamont, 2008); feedback trading (Chau et al, 2011); herding (Blasco 
et al, 2012; and Philippas et al, 2013); stock returns (Spyrou, 2012); volatility (Sayim et 
al, 2013); and bond yields (Nayak, 2010)). Specifically, we utilise a range of data from 
the OECD and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (DGEFA) resulting from business and consumer surveys which are 
                                                 
8
 In a recent paper Antoniou et al (2013) examine the role of sentiment on momentum profits in the US 
market, based on arguments relating to cognitive dissonance and information diffusion. They find that 
momentum profits are only evident in the presence of optimism. 
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designed to elicit judgements and expectations about the state of the economy.9 We are 
then able to obtain measures of changes in these indicators from time t-i to t. By utilising 
both futures data and confidence indicators, we are able to examine the role of 
aggregate expectations and (over)confidence and thus to answer the question of 
whether investors are naïve in relation to the impact of market states in explaining 
momentum profits. In other words we test whether the lagged market return is the only 
relevant type of conditioning information that is necessary for predicting momentum 
portfolio performance, as CGH claim; or whether expectations and sentiment are also 
important.   
 
It is, of course, the case that stock index futures prices are not available for long periods 
ahead (say the one, two or three years used by CGH). However, they are available 
typically for periods up to 8 months prior to maturity.10 It should be noted that the choice 
of period over which to examine market states is arbitrary, as CGH recognise. From a 
theoretical perspective, there is no reason to believe that 3 years is more relevant than 
say 6 months, in terms of capturing the state of the market.11 Indeed, there are strong 
arguments for suggesting that shorter horizons are more appropriate. For example, 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that myopic loss aversion can play a central role in 
explaining the equity premium puzzle, arguing that agency problems make it likely that 
even pension funds and endowment funds will be characterised by myopia. 
Furthermore, Haigh and List (2005) find that traders from the Chicago Board of Trade 
exhibit behaviour consistent with myopic loss aversion; Froot et al (1992) demonstrate 
the impact of short-horizon speculators on informational inefficiency; and Chang et al 
(2000) argue that herding in South Korea and Taiwan may be the result of short-horizon 
investors. Similarly, Fang (2012) “investigates the aggregate investor preferences and 
beliefs of the US stock market by examining enduring puzzles in finance” (p 546) and 
                                                 
9
 Two indicators, those relating to Consumer Confidence and Industrial Confidence are from OECD and 
the other three indicators used are from the DGEFA.  
10
 Frequently, stock index futures trade nine months prior to maturity. However, even in highly liquid 
markets the volume of trade for such contracts is relatively low and arguably the forward rate 
unbiasedness hypothesis is less likely to hold. 
11
 As noted by CGH, the results of using a 1, 2 or 3 year horizon are broadly similar. 
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results are consistent with loss aversion at both monthly and yearly horizons. In 
addition, the availability bias, whereby individuals give greater weight to information 
which most easily comes to mind, is also consistent with shorter investment horizons.12 
Therefore, in investigating the impact of market states on momentum profits, we 
partition our sample to states by first examining the difference between MPt and MPt-i 
and between MPt and E(MPt,t-i) for values of i ranging from 2 to 8 months.
13 We then 
partition the sample based on the following five sentiment indicators: the consumer 
confidence indicator; the retail trade confidence indicator; the construction confidence 
indicator; the industrial confidence indicator; and the economic sentiment indicator.14 By 
comparing actual prices, deviations of prices from expectations and market sentiment, 
important insights should be provided about the market and the attitude of market 
participants to actual prices, expectations and investor sentiment. 
 
There is evidence that during crisis periods financial decisions are made differently. For 
example, according to Anand et al. (2010) institutions invest more in stocks that are 
more liquid and less risky during periods of market stress and Choe et al. (1999) find 
that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis herding and positive-feedback trading by 
foreign investors fell markedly. However, in contrast, Philippas et al (2013) find no 
impact of the subprime crisis in relation to herding. In order to examine if differences are 
evident in relation to the issues examined here, we undertake analysis both for a period 
including the subprime crisis (which began in 2007/8) and a truncated sample period 
excluding the crisis. 
 
This paper, therefore, makes four contributions to the literature. First it proposes, and 
utilises, a comparison between the expected and actual market price in examining the 
                                                 
12
 See, for example, Massa and Simonov (2006) who examine the role of familiarity and find that 
availability impacts on the investment decisions of some investors. 
13
 Moreover, these periods for market movements are more in line with the periods used for identifying 
the individual stocks to be held when forming a momentum portfolio. 
14
 The economic sentiment indicator provided is a weighted composite indicator comprising the consumer 
confidence indicator (weight 20%), the retail trade confidence indicator (5%), the construction confidence 
indicator (5%), the industrial confidence indicator (40%) and the service confidence indicator (30%). 
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role of the state of the market. Second, it examines the impact of economy wide 
sentiment on momentum profits. Third, the paper undertakes an out-of-sample test of 
the role of the state of the market in explaining momentum profits, by analysing the 
issue for the UK market. Fourth, given our focus on behavioural explanations and in 
light of established arguments concerning frame dependence, we examine the extent to 
which the results vary when the subprime crisis period is excluded. The rest of the 
paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the data and methodology 
used. Section 3 presents and discusses the results, which are checked for robustness 
in section 4. Finally, section 5 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
 
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
For the formation of momentum portfolios, we begin by employing all stocks listed on 
the London Stock Exchange between June 1984 and December 2009. All price data 
used are taken from DataStream Thomson Reuters. Consistent with previous studies, 
we exclude all penny shares with a price of less than £1 at the start of the holding 
period to minimise microstructure effects. We include companies that were delisted 
during the period so as to avoid survivorship bias and we simulate realistic ex ante 
scenarios to avoid look-ahead bias. We assume that all companies are active during the 
holding period until the actual delisting takes place, at which time rebalancing of the 
portfolio takes place. The total sample of stocks used is 8821 and the average number 
used each month is 5511. Stocks are sorted at time t based on their returns in the 
period t-j and split into equally weighted quintiles. We then form a momentum portfolio 
one month after t, with the portfolio consisting of a long (short) position in the time t-j to t 
winner (loser) portfolio, i.e. the highest (lowest) quintile, and hold the portfolio for k 
months.15 Previous literature typically uses strategies ranging from 3 to 12 months, with 
most attention focused on 3 and 6 months. We restrict ourselves to two strategies, 
namely the 3x3 and 6x6 combinations. The first, allows us to examine one of the most 
                                                 
15
 In line with previous literature, a month is skipped between the ranking period and the start of the 
holding period to avoid factors which may induce negative serial correlation (see, for example, Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1993, who skip a week). We skip a month as we are using monthly data.  
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profitable strategies in the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and the latter, 
one of the most typical momentum strategies in the literature as suggested by Galariotis 
(2010). 
 
For each holding period we calculate raw momentum portfolio returns (Rp) as well as 
risk adjusted returns considering market risk in the form of the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) and multifactor risk in the form of the Fama and French three-factor 
model (FF3F henceforth). In the CAPM specification the market factor proxy is based on 
the value weighted FT All Share Index and the 3-month t-bill rate proxies for the nominal 
risk free rate. Two additional factors constructed as in Fama and French (1996) are 
employed in the multifactor analysis: the return difference between portfolios of small 
and large capitalisation stocks (SMB); and the return difference between portfolios of 
high and low book-to-market ratio stocks (HML). 
 
To ensure consistency throughout the sample period, we define the stock index future 
expiry day as time t and form momentum portfolios one month after the expiry date 
based on the performance of individual stocks in the period prior to t. To examine the 
impact of the market state we identify the prior state of the market at the beginning of 
each portfolio’s testing period, based either on actual market prices at times t and t-i or 
on deviations between the actual market price at time t and its expected time t price, 
where the expectation was formed at time t-i.   
 
As explained, stock index futures data is used to examine the role of expectations. 
Futures on stock indices were introduced in the UK in May 1984 and to allow collection 
of futures data with a sufficient history prior to expiry of the contract, we begin by having 
the first holding period commence one month after the expiry of the December 1984 
contract. Our futures sample covers the period up to the expiry of the June 2009 
contract. There are four contract expiry dates each year (March, June, September and 
December) and we form non-overlapping portfolios for the 3x3 and 6x6 strategies. We 
use the FTSE-100 stock index return between times t and t-i to determine the state of 
the market using actual prices and to examine the impact of expectations we use the 
difference between the FTSE-100 index price at time t and its futures price at time t-i for 
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the contract expiring at time t. In considering both actual prices and expectations, i 
takes on the values 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 months. When actual prices are used, the approach 
utilised by CGH is employed. If MPt  MPt-i then the market state is defined as UP. If  
MPt < MPt-i then the market state is defined as DOWN. For comparing the actual and 
expected prices with the futures price at time t-i, we start by defining the market as 
being up relative to expectations (UPE) if MPt  E(MPt,t-i) and down relative to 
expectations (DOWNE) if MPt < E(MPt,t-i).
16  
 
To examine the role of sentiment changes in explaining momentum profits, we use the 
OECD and DGEFA data (from DataStream) resulting from business and consumer 
surveys concerning expectations about the state of the economy. The surveys are used 
to provide confidence or sentiment indicators on a monthly basis. We use the change in 
the indicator from time t-i to t to examine the impact of improving or declining confidence 
(or sentiment) on subsequent momentum profits. Since we focus on expectations and 
market states, we control for the subprime crisis period, due to its extreme nature and 
possible impact on results (the rationale is analytically explained in the relevant section). 
For robustness we repeat all tests by ending the sample in August 2007.17 
 
3. RESULTS 
The empirical analysis first considers momentum profits in up and down markets based 
on raw returns. Table 1 presents raw profits to the zero investment portfolio, with panel 
A showing results for the ‘UP/UPE’ market state and panel B the results for the 
‘DOWN/DOWNE’ market state. The first two columns relate to the 3x3 strategy and the 
final two columns the 6x6 strategy. The first and third columns show profits for those 
cases where the sample is split based on the relationship between the actual price of 
the index at time t (MPt) and the actual price at time t-i (MPt-i). The second and fourth 
                                                 
16
 In the remainder of the paper we will use upper case UP/DOWN to relate to market states based on 
actual prices and UPE/DOWNE to relate to market states based on expectations. Lower case ‘up’ and 
‘down’ will be used to refer in general to categories of market states. 
17
 Given that there is not a precise date for the start of the crisis, we also repeat the analysis including the 
period up to August 2008. In the interests of brevity we compare in the text, where appropriate, the 
differences between the two sets of results, without presenting tables. 
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columns show profits for a sample split based on the relationship between the actual 
price of the index at time t (MPt) and the value of the index at time t expected at time t-i 
(EMPt,t-i). The first figure in each column relates to mean returns and the figure in 
square brackets to median returns. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Considering the first two columns of the table, momentum profits are consistently 
positive for the 3x3 strategy irrespective of whether the CGH approach or expectations 
are employed to define market states. Profits are significantly different from zero for all 
up market cases (panel A) and for all but one down market cases (when the sample 
split is based on i=6, panel B), contrary to the CGH findings of momentum losses. 
Following down market periods, the returns for momentum strategies in table 1 are 
positive and even higher than following up market periods.18 For example, using actual 
market prices (the CGH basis for the up/down split) up market returns are economically 
significant and range from 1.91% per month to about 2.23% per month. However, the 
smallest return for down markets (2.36%) is larger than the highest one for up markets 
and the returns for down markets go as high as 3.69%.19 This result is consistent with 
Griffin et al (2005) for the US market who use macroeconomic criteria for sample splits.  
 
Results for splits based on expectations (UPE/DOWNE) show a similar pattern to those 
using the CGH (UP/DOWN) approach, however there are some differences between 
the two approaches. Specifically, when the median values are used, a pattern emerges 
for the returns based on expectations, which is not evident when actual prices are used. 
In particular, for UPE (DOWNE) markets the portfolio median returns are monotonically 
decreasing (increasing) as values of i move from 2 to 8 months. More specifically, in the 
first case they move from 2.39% to 1.90%, while in the latter case they change from 
                                                 
18
 CGH attribute losses following down markets to lower overconfidence and higher risk aversion, which is 
not consistent with the findings here. 
19
 The results for median returns show a similar pattern, with down market returns being higher than up 
market returns for all values of i. 
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2.03% to 2.78%. Nonetheless, overall the results from using expectations are not 
noticeably different from those using actual prices. 
 
Panel C provides tests of equality of the mean under the assumptions of equal 
variances.20 For the 3x3 strategy, in all cases the null hypothesis that the mean profits in 
UP and DOWN markets are equal is not rejected, which, given the presence of 
momentum profits in both states, is not surprising. These results are in stark contrast to 
the findings of CGH, in that there is no evidence that momentum profits vary with the 
state of the market for the 3x3 strategy. The negative signs in panel C are contrary to 
expectations and may be the result of extreme market periods having a higher impact 
than more normal up and down periods. This will be investigated in section 4.  
 
Results for the 6x6 strategy, reported in the third and fourth columns of table 1 are 
different to those for the 3x3 strategy. More specifically, in both panels A and B mean 
returns are overall positive but insignificant.21 Panel C shows that there are very few 
significant differences: for the split based on MPt-i there is evidence of a significant 
difference between returns in up and down markets in two cases based on the mean 
(when the sample split is based on i=4 and 6); when the split is based on expectations, 
there is only one case where the down market profits are significantly higher than those 
in the up market state using the mean profits (when the sample split is based on i=4).22 
In contrast to CGH, in all cases of significant differences the returns following down 
market states are higher than those following up markets.  
 
                                                 
20
Tests of (i) the equality of mean returns assuming unequal variances and (ii) the equality of median 
returns, were also undertaken, but are not reported in the interests of brevity. In general, the findings from 
the three tests are qualitatively similar. Reference will be made in the text where there are qualitative 
differences. 
21
 Exceptions in relation to significance relate to when the sample is split based on i=3 for both measures 
in panel A, and for i=8 for down markets in panel B for the CGH measure. The only negative coefficients 
are for i=6 in the up market. 
22
 There are no significant differences in median returns or in mean returns when unequal variances are 
assumed. 
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Overall, the findings so far suggest that market states do not seem to have the impact 
on the performance of momentum portfolios predicted by CGH. Rather, on average 
momentum strategies are profitable irrespective of state. In this setting, where market 
states do not matter, the expectations-based (futures prices) approach for splitting up 
and down markets does not add significant explanatory power to that obtained by the 
CGH approach.23 
 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results for momentum profits based on returns adjusted by the CAPM and the FF3F 
factors are shown in tables 2 and 3 respectively. The layout of the tables is the same as 
in table 1. Interestingly, the results in these tables are markedly different from those for 
raw returns, highlighting the importance of taking account of risk. For the 3x3 strategy, 
while there were statistically significant momentum profits in table 1 for raw returns, they 
become insignificant once market (table 2) or FF3F factor adjustments (table 3) are 
performed for both up and down market states.24 While in down states there is a negative 
value (when the sample split is based on i=8) following the adjustments, it is insignificant. 
It should be noted, however, that CGH also find no evidence of significant profits at the 
5% level for some of their strategies when CAPM and FF3F adjusted returns are used, 
while they also find that in most cases returns are positive. However, given the results in 
tables 2 and 3 it is not surprising that in panel C there is no case where the 3x3 strategy 
mean return is significantly different across market states. It seems again that momentum 
profits are unrelated to market states irrespective of whether one uses actual prices or the 
expectations-based measure, once risk is taken into account. Indeed, for the period 
examined, adjusting for risk leads to a lack of momentum profits following both up and 
down markets.  
                                                 
23
 However, the expectations-based approach remains as an alternative, arguably less naive, method, 
which may be more applicable in other markets. 
24
 The only exceptions relate to significance at the 10% level for CAPM adjusted up market returns for 
i=2, 3 and 8 for the CGH measure and for i=8 for the expectations-based measure. However, not only is 
the statistical significance low, but economic significance is also low, especially when compared to table 
1. 
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Turning to the 6x6 strategy in the final two columns of table 2, panel A, CAPM adjusted 
momentum delivers no statistically significant returns irrespective of market states using a 
measure based on either actual price changes or expectations. The difference here 
compared to table 1 is that in some cases momentum returns are negative albeit 
insignificant and in contrast to the arguments of CGH this holds for both the UP/UPE 
market and the DOWN/DOWNE market states. Looking at the same columns of table 3 
however, where results for FF3F adjusted returns are presented, all momentum returns 
for both measures and states are, contrary to the arguments of CGH, positive and now 
with more cases that are statistically significant, especially for up markets. The up market 
results are also very significant economically, ranging from 5.3% to 13.48%. However, as 
in the case for raw returns, panel C of both tables 2 and 3, and for both the 3x3 and the 
6x6 strategy show there are no significant differences in means across market states.25 
Taken together, results for tables 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate the importance of how returns 
are measured (raw, CAPM adjusted or FF3F adjusted) when considering the significance 
of momentum strategies. However, findings relating to the extent to which market states 
impact on momentum profits are largely unaffected by the measure of returns, since 
statistical differences across market states are an exception whichever measure of risk is 
used. 
 
The results so far show that for raw returns the 3x3 strategy experiences statistically and 
economically significant returns for both up and down market periods, yet they are 
marginally higher for down markets. When risk adjustments are made the returns become 
insignificant, but are higher for up markets rather than down ones. The exact opposite 
holds for the 6x6 strategy where results are generally insignificant for raw returns, but 
become significant when multiple contemporaneous risk considerations are taken into 
account. Given the lack of significant differences across market states the CGH results 
and proposition appear to be sample-specific. Furthermore, the differences between splits 
based on actual prices and expectations are small, suggesting that using a more 
                                                 
25
 The only exception is for the 6x6 strategy when i=4, with mean returns being significantly different at 
the 10% level assuming equal variances. However, the differences in mean returns are insignificant when 
assuming unequal variances. Similarly, there are no significant differences between median returns. 
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sophisticated approach based on expectations adds little to our understanding of the 
impact of market state. However, while up versus down states based on prices (actual or 
expected) does not reveal differences in momentum profits, measures of sentiment may 
be important for momentum profits. We now turn to investigate this issue. 
 
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Tables 4 and 5 exhibit the relationship of momentum profits and market states for the 
3x3 strategy when the split into up or down market states is determined by business 
and consumer surveys.26 Table 4 shows results for market adjusted returns and table 5 
for FF3F adjusted returns. Columns two to five show results for splits based on five 
sentiment indicators: construction; retail; consumer; industrial; and a composite 
economic sentiment indicator respectively. For convenience and comparison purposes, 
the first column of each table presents again the results for the CGH split in tables 2 and 
3 (for tables 4 and 5 respectively). The results for the two sets of adjusted returns are 
broadly similar. In table 4, as can be seen from column one, the CGH split led to 
positive returns in all cases, contrary to their arguments, yet statistically significant only 
for up market cases. For all five sentiment indicators, the values of momentum profits in 
up markets are all positive, and statistically significant in 40% of cases. There is one 
significant value for each of the sentiment and industrial factors, three for the retail 
factor, but for the construction factor split, which seems to be the most informative, 
profits are significant throughout. This is confirmed by the results for down markets in 
panel B of the same table, where no value is significant, yet, all the values relating to 
the construction factor are negative as expected. The other factors offer few negative 
values. 
 
The results in table 5, column one relate to the FF3F factor adjusted returns and are all 
statistically insignificant yet positive for both down and up markets, except for i=8 for 
                                                 
26
 This part of the analysis concentrates on the 3x3 strategy, since the sample numbers for the 6x6 
strategy are relatively low. In addition, given the results in tables 1-3 for the 3x3 strategy, if significant 
differences are found here for this strategy, this would provide strong support for the importance of 
sentiment. 
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DOWN. As regards the signs and significances, the results for panels A and B are 
generally in line with table 4. More specifically, all profits in up markets split on the basis 
of sentiment indicators from columns two to five are positive, but in many cases they are 
insignificantly different from zero. However, once again they are consistently statistically 
significant for construction (exception for split based on i=6). They are also significant 
for one (two) case(s) for the sentiment (retail) factor. The DOWN market values are 
consistently negative for construction, but insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Panel C of tables 4 and 5 show that as far as the consumer, industrial and sentiment 
factors are concerned, the differences in profits between up and down markets are 
generally insignificant.27 However, for construction and retail indicators the differences 
are significantly in two cases each, with differences having the sign predicted by the 
arguments of CGH. This pattern holds for both market adjusted and FF3F adjusted 
returns.28 Furthermore, in both tables the differences between up and down momentum 
profits are of the expected sign for all (4 out of 5) values of t-i for the split based on the 
construction (retail) indicator. 
 
Overall, tables 4 and 5 indicate that there are different patterns to momentum returns 
under different market states when those states are determined based on sentiment 
indicators. Generally, the two most relevant indicators appear to be the construction and 
the retail ones. Given the importance the media often gives these two measures as a 
barometer of economic activity, it is interesting that differences are seen when they are 
used as the basis for an up/down split.29,30 
                                                 
27
 There is one exception: using CAPM returns for the sentiment indicator for i=3. 
28
 This pattern relates to the case of assuming equal variances (panel C). If unequal variances are 
assumed there are three significant differences for FF3F returns for the construction indicator. For results 
in tables 4 and 5 there are no significant differences when median returns are used. 
29
 For example, an article in The Telegraph newspaper on 11
th
 July 2012, refers to a letter from high 
profile business leaders in the construction industry marking “the start of a new campaign called “Creating 
Britain’s Future”, which is designed to highlight the importance of the sector. It claims every £1 invested in 
construction generates £2.84 in economic activity, and the assets built “are vital to keep the UK economy 
competitive”.  
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4. ROBUSTNESS  
The sample period analysed thus far includes the subprime crisis, which had different 
characteristics and a huge impact compared to any other crises since the great 
depression. Given the earlier findings regarding the role of risk and potentially the 
psychological biases that can be exacerbated during such an extreme period, this 
section excludes data post-August 2007.31 Hence, the tests and analysis are repeated 
in this section up to August 2007 with five tables that correspond to the earlier ones, i.e. 
each table from 6 to 10 corresponds one-to-one to each table from 1 to 5. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
In table 6, we can see that for the 3x3 strategy, when excluding the crisis period there is 
no real difference to the full sample period as far as panels A and C are concerned. The 
statistical significances are as in table 1, while the mean and median returns are close 
to the full sample ones. For example, the 2 month 3x3 strategy mean value in panel A of 
tables 1 and 6 is 0.0193 and 0.0194 respectively and both are significant at the 1% 
level. Where there seems to be an impact of the post-subprime crisis is on the mean 
returns of momentum portfolios during down markets (panel B). More specifically, when 
the crisis period is excluded the mean returns appear to be much lower yet positive, still 
contrary to the arguments of CGH. In the remaining panel, the null hypothesis that the 
mean profits in UP and DOWN markets are equal is never rejected as in table 1, in stark 
contrast to the findings of CGH that momentum profits vary with the state of the market. 
The results are similar for the expectations measure that we propose (yet with more 
                                                                                                                                                             
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/constructionandproperty/9393772/Construction-
industry-calls-on-Government-to-boost-infrastructure.html) 
30
 There is evidence that momentum profits may be due to the activities of individual investors (see, for 
example, Hvidkjaer, 2006; and Dorn et al, 2008). In contrast, futures prices are likely to capture the 
expectations of institutional investors. This may explain why expectations do not appear to impact on 
momentum profits, but sentiment does. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting 
this. 
31
 We also perform the tests using data for an extra year up to August 2008 to see the impact of the key 
early stage of this crisis; we do not report the tables for reasons of brevity, but discuss the findings, where 
appropriate. 
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significant cases), i.e. when the market behaves worse than expected (DOWNE), the 
returns are lower than in table 1, but still positive. 
As regards the 6x6 strategy, the results are similar to table 1, with the same returns 
being significant, and no clear difference between up and down markets with both 
measures of market prices (actual and expectations) used here.  
 
INSERT TABLES 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results for momentum profits based on returns adjusted for movements in the market 
and the FF3F factors are shown in tables 7 (related to table 2) and 8 (related to table 3) 
respectively. For the 3x3 portfolio the results with both adjustments are similar to the full 
sample results for all panels except panel B, i.e. when following down market periods. In 
panel B, the mean and, to a lesser extent, the median risk adjusted returns appear 
much higher when the crisis is excluded, yet as before panel C shows no statistically 
significant differences between periods. In relation to the 6x6 strategy, they are overall 
insignificant as for the full sample, but have the sign anticipated by CGH following down 
markets once risk is adjusted by the CAPM in table 7 (with returns even lower when the 
crisis period is excluded both in terms of mean and median). However, the differences 
between up and down markets are as before (with one exception for i=4 for mean 
returns assuming equal variances) insignificant for both measures used here. As far as 
the FF3F adjusted returns are concerned in table 8, the risk adjusted results are 
consistent with the rest of our evidence and contrary to the CGH arguments. 
Specifically, they are positive following both up and down market periods irrespective of 
the method of splitting the sample used. Hence it is not surprising that there are no 
statistically significant differences in performance between up and down markets in 
panel C.  
 
Overall in tables 7 and 8, consistent with the full sample results in tables 2 and 3, and 
contrary to CGH, risk adjusted returns between up and down market periods do not 
differ significantly. The same holds for our proposed expectations measure. Thus, the 
findings in tables 1-3, that momentum profits are insignificantly different across up and 
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down markets, and contrary to the findings for the US in CGH, are not the result of 
including the crisis period. 
 
As a final robustness test of the expectations-based approach, we examine whether the 
extent to which expectations have or have not been met impacts on momentum 
profits.32 Specifically, we exclude cases where the actual price is within 10% of the 
expected price and split the remaining sample into those cases where the price is (i) 
more than 10% higher than expected and (ii) more than 10% lower than expected. In all 
cases (for raw, CAPM adjusted and FF3F adjusted returns using both 3x3 and 6x6 
strategies) there is no significant difference in momentum profits between the two 
groups at the 10% level of significance. 
 
INSERT TABLES 9 AND 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
Tables 9 and 10 correspond to tables 4 and 5 respectively and relate to the 3x3 strategy 
for the sample pre-September 2007. In table 9, as for table 4, in up markets the profits 
are economically and statistically significant in all cases when the split is based on the 
construction factor. In relation to the split based on the retail factor they are also 
significant in two cases, that is, when splitting markets based on the indicator’s data 
over the last 2 months and the last quarter. Finally, profits for the split based on the 
sentiment factor are also significant in up markets when information for the split is 
based on the news of the last quarter. The results as far as up markets are concerned 
are, therefore, consistent with the full sample results, i.e. in up markets the construction 
indicator is the most relevant.  
 
However, when looking at the down market split in the same table, the results are 
different to those in tables 4 and 5. For the sample period including the post-subprime 
crisis period, momentum profits were insignificant in all cases following down markets 
and negative (albeit insignificant) when the sample was split using the construction 
indicator. Furthermore, tables 4 and 5 suggest there are significant differences between 
                                                 
32
 We thank a referee for suggesting this robustness check. In the interests of brevity, results are not 
reported. 
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up and down markets, consistent with CGH. However, in tables 9 and 10 profits 
following down markets are positive in all cases (and significantly so in 11(7) cases 
using CAPM (FF3F) returns). Moreover, in tables 9 and 10 there are cases where 
profits following up markets are significantly higher than following down markets, as well 
as cases where the former are significantly lower than the latter. Thus, the evidence that 
up/down splits based on construction and retail indicators are important determinants of 
momentum profits appear to be driven by the post-subprime crisis period.33 
 
Overall one can argue that the results of CGH are market specific, or at least that they 
do not hold for the UK, as their measure and the first expectations measure that we 
propose for splitting markets to up and down ones, do not seem to anticipate 
momentum performance. This is robust to both including and excluding the subprime 
crisis period. In general, following up market periods the construction sentiment 
indicator is better in anticipating momentum performance, but this does not hold true 
when the crisis period is excluded. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the extent to which market states impact on momentum profits for 
the UK market. However, rather than simply categorising markets as in CGH as up or 
down based on a comparison of actual market prices, we suggest that sentiment and/or 
expectations are important in determining momentum performance. Hence, in 
examining the interaction of market states and momentum profits, a number of ways are 
used to determine whether the market is up or down. In addition to using the split 
suggested by CGH that compares the actual value of an index at two points in time, we 
also split the sample based on different measures of expectations and sentiment. First, 
we use index futures prices to obtain a market-determined measure of expectations, 
with an up market being defined as the case where the actual price at time t is higher 
than the futures price determined at time t-i for delivery at time t and the down market 
determined similarly. Second, we split the sample based on changes in five market 
sentiment indicators derived from business and consumer surveys. In addition, we not 
                                                 
33
 In relation to both tables 9 and 10, there are no cases where the median returns are different across 
market states. 
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only present results for raw returns, but also for returns adjusted for risk using the 
market and the Fama-French factors. Two strategies are considered, namely the 3x3 
and the 6x6. 
 
Results for the 3x3 strategy are contrary to the findings and arguments of CGH both 
including the most recent crisis period and excluding it. Momentum performance is 
statistically and economically significant in both up and down market states and if 
anything higher in the latter. When the subprime crisis period is excluded, momentum 
returns remain positive and mostly significant following both up and down markets, 
hence down states are not associated with losses, contrary to CGH. These results hold 
irrespective of whether the up/down split is based on actual prices or expectations. The 
findings from the risk adjustments show that the performance is related to risk. For the 
full sample period the raw significant momentum returns become insignificant once risk 
is considered. Exclusion of the subprime crisis period leads to the loss of significance 
being much more subtle, affecting only the CGH measure and not the expectations 
measure we propose here. The results for the 6x6 strategy are similar when including 
and when excluding the subprime crisis period, but they are again inconsistent with 
CGH, as market states do not affect momentum performance. 
 
When considering the impact of up/down splits based on sentiment indicators, results 
are more meaningful as indicators can anticipate momentum performance in both up 
and down markets. However, the role of sentiment indicators is not evident when the 
post-subprime crisis period is excluded. Thus, the main findings of CGH for the US 
appear not to hold for the UK, whether splits are based on actual prices, expected 
prices or sentiment. Furthermore, the importance of considering the role of the subprime 
crisis is highlighted by the results presented here. The results in this paper are relevant 
to investors seeking to exploit momentum strategies based on market states and 
suggest that the results for the US may not hold in other markets. 
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Table 1: Momentum Profits and Market States: Raw Returns 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 6 x 6 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
2 months 0.0193*** 0.0212*** 0.0755 0.0755 
 [0.0203] [0.0239] [0.0353] [0.0353] 
3 months 0.0207*** 0.0210*** 0.0210*** 0.0210** 
 [0.0219] [0.0226] [0.0353] [0.0359] 
4 months 0.0223*** 0.0218*** 0.0009 0.0005 
 [0.0219] [0.0202] [0.0184] [0.0196] 
6 months 0.0222*** 0.0233*** -0.0006 -0.0019 
 [0.0191] [0.0193] [0.0256] [0.0256] 
8 months 0.0196*** 0.0179*** 0.0966 0.0172 
 [0.0202] [0.0190] [0.0332] [0.0311] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
2 months 0.0284*** 0.0252** 0.0048 0.0048 
 [0.0245] [0.0203] [0.0196] [0.0196] 
3 months 0.0268** 0.0259** 0.1083 0.1031 
 [0.0240] [0.0238] [0.0156] [0.0180] 
4 months 0.0243* 0.0249** 0.1843 0.1417 
 [0.0240] [0.0240] [0.0449] [0.0410] 
6 months 0.0236 0.0215 0.1578 0.1414 
 [0.0249] [0.0245] [0.0449] [0.0411] 
8 months 0.0369** 0.0353*** 0.0402*** 0.1626 
 [0.0264] [0.0278] [0.0411] [0.0411] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months -0.833 -0.368 0.855 0.855 
3 months -0.548 -0.442 -1.029 -0.982 
4 months -0.170 -0.281 -2.107** -1.723* 
6 months -0.116 0.152 -1.764* -1.633 
8 months -1.308 -1.385 0.501 -1.383 
 
The table presents results on the raw returns of the zero cost investment portfolio for the period between December 1984 and 
December 2009. The first and third column show returns for those cases where the sample is split based on the relationship 
between the actual price of the index at time t (MPt) and the actual price at time t-i (MPt-i) for the 3x3 and 6x6 strategies, 
respectively. The second and fourth columns show returns for a sample split based on the relationship between the actual price of 
the index at time t (MPt) and the value of the index at time t expected at time t-i (EMPt,t-i) for the 3x3 and 6x6 strategies, respectively, 
where i = 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. Panel A contains the results for UP/UPE market states, while panel B for DOWN/DOWNE market states. 
The first figure in each cell in panels A and B relates to mean returns and the figure in square brackets to median returns. Panel C 
provides results on the equality of the mean returns for the UP/UPE and DOWN/DOWNE market states assuming equal variances. * 
indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level. 
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Table 2: Momentum Profits and Market States: CAPM Returns 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 6 x 6 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
2 months 0.0108* 0.0089 -0.0463 -0.0463 
 [0.0094] [0.0083] [0.0331] [0.0331] 
3 months 0.0092* 0.0088 0.0091 0.0091 
 [0.0072] [0.0065] [0.0331] [0.0373] 
4 months 0.0077 0.0083 0.0295 0.0263 
 [0.0088] [0.0094] [0.0466] [0.0394] 
6 months 0.0075 0.0063 0.0184 0.0182 
 [0.0094] [0.0091] [0.0315] [0.0315] 
8 months 0.0098* 0.0109* -0.0863 -0.0141 
 [0.0094] [0.0097] [0.0179] [0.0247] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
2 months 0.0015 0.0048 0.0425 0.0425 
 [0.0048] [0.0079] [0.0324] [0.0324] 
3 months 0.0032 0.0044 -0.0607 -0.0565 
 [0.0100] [0.0101] [0.0324] [0.0275] 
4 months 0.0057 0.0051 -0.1332 -0.0888 
 [0.0068] [0.0054] [-0.0210] [-0.0059] 
6 months 0.0064 0.0086 -0.0907 -0.0776 
 [0.0051] [0.0054] [0.0275] [0.0275] 
8 months -0.0077 -0.0051 0.0208 -0.1017 
 [0.0023] [0.0012] [0.0032] [-0.0059] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months 0.838 0.375 -1.042 -1.042 
3 months 0.532 0.395 0.794 0.756 
4 months 0.179 0.288 1.786* 1.344 
6 months 0.095 -0.190 1.155 1.042 
8 months 1.309 1.252 -0.944 1.162 
 
The table presents results on the CAPM-adjusted returns of the zero cost investment portfolio for the period between December 
1984 and December 2009. The first and third column show returns for those cases where the sample is split based on the 
relationship between the actual price of the index at time t (MPt) and the actual price at time t-i (MPt-i) for the 3x3 and 6x6 strategies, 
respectively. The second and fourth columns show returns for a sample split based on the relationship between the actual price of 
the index at time t (MPt) and the value of the index at time t expected at time t-i (EMPt,t-i) for the 3x3 and 6x6 strategies, respectively, 
where i = 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. Panel A contains the results for UP/UPE market states, while panel B for DOWN/DOWNE market states. 
The first figure in each cell in panels A and B relates to mean returns and the figure in square brackets to median returns. Panel C 
provides results on the equality of the mean returns for the UP/UPE and DOWN/DOWNE market states assuming equal variances. * 
indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level.   
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Table 3: Momentum Profits and Market States: FF3F Returns 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 6 x 6 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
2 months 0.0070 0.0046 0.0785 0.0785 
 [0.0055] [0.0002] [0.1067] [0.1067] 
3 months 0.0067 0.0063 0.1159*** 0.1197*** 
 [0.0031] [0.0011] [0.1067] [0.1094] 
4 months 0.0053 0.0063 0.1307*** 0.1348*** 
 [0.0057] [0.0079] [0.1123] [0.1123] 
6 months 0.0047 0.0036 0.1268*** 0.1301*** 
 [0.0020] [0.0025] [0.1064] [0.1096] 
8 months 0.0048 0.0056 0.0530 0.1285*** 
 [0.0016] [-0.0019] [0.0970] [0.1121] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
2 months 0.0018 0.0053 0.1416*** 0.1416*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0064] [0.1196] [0.1196] 
3 months 0.0018 0.0028 0.0722 0.0676 
 [0.0044] [0.0050] [0.1571] [0.1334] 
4 months 0.0041 0.0027 0.0213 0.0392 
 [0.0044] [0.0029] [0.1807] [0.1239] 
6 months 0.0046 0.0065 0.0457 0.0498 
 [0.0064] [0.0044] [0.1807] [0.1153] 
8 months -0.0079 -0.0060 0.1468*** 0.0224 
 [0.0007] [0.0020] [0.1523] [0.1153] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months 0.475 -0.072 -0.817 -0.817 
3 months 0.444 0.321 0.547 0.664 
4 months 0.099 0.325 1.311 1.233 
6 months 0.010 -0.249 0.944 0.962 
8 months 0.970 0.928 -0.889 1.057 
 
The table presents results on the Fama-French factors-adjusted returns of the zero cost investment portfolio for the period between 
December 1984 and December 2009. The first and third column show returns for those cases where the sample is split based on 
the relationship between the actual price of the index at time t (MPt) and the actual price at time t-i (MPt-i) for the 3x3 and 6x6 
strategies, respectively, where i = 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. The second and fourth columns show returns for a sample split based on the 
relationship between the actual price of the index at time t (MPt) and the value of the index at time t expected at time t-i (EMPt,t-i) for 
the 3x3 and 6x6 strategies, respectively. Panel A contains the results for UP/UPE market states, while panel B for DOWN/DOWNE 
market states. The first figure in each cell in panels A and B relates to mean returns and the figure in square brackets to median 
returns. Panel C provides results on the equality of the mean returns for the UP/UPE and DOWN/DOWNE market states assuming 
equal variances. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level.   
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Table 4: Momentum Profits and Investor Sentiment Market States: CAPM Returns 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
Construction 
Up 
Retail 
Up 
Consumer  
Up 
Industrial 
Up 
Sentiment 
Up 
2 months 0.0108* 0.0155** 0.0168** 0.0094 0.0117* 0.0102 
 [0.0094] [0.0142] [0.0123] [0.0099] [0.0104] [0.0107] 
3 months 0.0092* 0.0149* 0.0181** 0.0065 0.0098 0.0142** 
 [0.0072] [0.0101] [0.0138] [0.0094] [0.0101] [0.0104] 
4 months 0.0077 0.0148** 0.0111* 0.0053 0.0079 0.0059 
 [0.0088] [0.0106] [0.0107] [0.0088] [0.0099] [0.0091] 
6 months 0.0075 0.0130* 0.0097 0.0004 0.0087 0.0100 
 [0.0094] [0.0107] [0.0096] [0.0063] [0.0086] [0.0097] 
8 months 0.0098* 0.0144** 0.0066 -0.0009 0.0083 0.0067 
 [0.0094] [0.0106] [0.0070] [0.0044] [0.0088] [0.0086] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-i 
DOWN 
Construction 
Down 
Retail 
Down 
Consumer  
Down 
Industrial 
Down 
Sentiment 
Down 
2 months 0.0015 -0.0041 -0.0027 0.0045 0.0024 0.0048 
 [0.0048] [0.0044] [0.0014] [0.0048] [0.0019] [0.0030] 
3 months 0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0027 0.0081 0.0047 -0.0027 
 [0.0100] [0.0042] [0.0012] [0.0051] [0.0030] [0.0027] 
4 months 0.0057 -0.0020 0.0037 0.0095 0.0065 0.0088 
 [0.0068] [0.0030] [0.0039] [0.0057] [0.0033] [0.0054] 
6 months 0.0064 -0.0026 0.0045 0.0141 0.0050 0.0037 
 [0.0051] [0.0019] [0.0054] [0.0128] [0.0057] [0.0033] 
8 months -0.0077 -0.0044 0.0075 0.0159 0.0055 0.0069 
 [0.0023] [0.0012] [0.0081] [0.0150] [0.0054] [0.0057] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months 0.838 1.817* 1.828* 0.450 0.858 0.446 
3 months 0.532 1.520 1.948** -0.152 0.472 1.746* 
4 months 0.179 1.560 0.681 -0.386 0.131 -0.318 
6 months 0.095 1.410 0.477 -1.255 0.352 0.572 
8 months 1.309 1.716* -0.085 -1.533 0.259 -0.021 
 
This table presents results on the CAPM-adjusted returns of the zero cost investment portfolio for the period between December 
1984 and December 2009. The first column shows returns for those cases where the sample is split based on the relationship 
between the actual price of the index at time t (MPt) and the actual price at time t-i (MPt-i) for the 3x3 strategy, where i = 2, 3, 4, 6, 
and 8. The remaining five columns exhibit returns for a sample split based on the relationship between the actual price of a 
sentiment-index at time t and the value of that index at time t-i for the 3x3strategy, where i = 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. The sentiment indices 
used here are the Construction Confidence Index, the Consumer Confidence Index, the Industrial Confidence Index, the Retail 
Trade Confidence Index and the Economic Confidence Index obtained from OECD and DGEFA. Panel A contains the results for UP 
market states, while panel B for DOWN market states. The first figure in each cell in panels A and B relates to mean returns and the 
figure in square brackets to median returns. Panel C provides results on the equality of the mean returns for the UP and DOWN 
market states assuming equal variances. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   
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Table 5: Momentum Profits and Investor Sentiment Market States: FF3F Returns 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
Construction 
Up 
Retail 
Up 
Consumer  
Up 
Industrial 
Up 
Sentiment 
Up 
2 months 0.0070 0.0130* 0.0145** 0.0058 0.0081 0.0067 
 [0.0055] [0.0087] [0.0106] [0.0065] [0.0079] [0.0050] 
3 months 0.0067 0.0128* 0.0151** 0.0037 0.0062 0.0106* 
 [0.0031] [0.0077] [0.0113] [0.0050] [0.0079] [0.0083] 
4 months 0.0053 0.0131* 0.0072 0.0026 0.0049 0.0027 
 [0.0057] [0.0087] [0.0079] [0.0044] [0.0079] [0.0051] 
6 months 0.0047 0.0106 0.0069 -0.0021 0.0056 0.0072 
 [0.0020] [0.0055] [0.0064] [0.0015] [0.0038] [0.0051] 
8 months 0.0048 0.0117* 0.0030 -0.0024 0.0046 0.0031 
 [0.0016] [0.0077] [0.0029] [-0.0006] [0.0029] [0.0020] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-i 
DOWN 
Construction 
Down 
Retail 
Down 
Consumer  
Down 
Industrial 
Down 
Sentiment 
Down 
2 months 0.0018 -0.0059 -0.0047 0.0039 0.0017 0.0036 
 [0.0037] [-0.0019] [-0.0033] [0.0031] [-0.0012] [0.0031] 
3 months 0.0018 -0.0036 -0.0041 0.0069 0.0041 -0.0031 
 [0.0044] [-0.0019] [-0.0019] [0.0037] [0.0010] [-0.0006] 
4 months 0.0041 -0.0047 0.0030 0.0082 0.0054 0.0076 
 [0.0044] [-0.0038] [0.0007] [0.0060] [0.0025] [0.0043] 
6 months 0.0046 -0.0044 0.0029 0.0126 0.0040 0.0024 
 [0.0064] [-0.0033] [0.0031] [0.0079] [0.0050] [0.0037] 
8 months -0.0079 -0.0058 0.0065 0.0133 0.0050 0.0064 
 [0.0007] [-0.0059] [0.0055] [0.0082] [0.0078] [0.0077] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months 0.475 1.788* 1.842* 0.183 0.599 0.258 
3 months 0.444 1.560 1.833* -0.292 0.204 1.485 
4 months 0.099 1.691* 0.398 -0.528 -0.039 -0.511 
6 months 0.010 1.389 0.374 -1.369 0.163 0.442 
8 months 0.970 1.628 -0.323 -1.456 -0.044 -0.297 
 
This table presents results on the Fama-French factors-adjusted returns of the zero cost investment portfolio for the period between 
December 1984 and December 2009. The first column shows returns for those cases where the sample is split based on the 
relationship between the actual price of the index at time t (MPt) and the actual price at time t-i (MPt-i) for the 3x3 strategy, where i = 
2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. The remaining five columns exhibit returns for a sample split based on the relationship between the actual price of 
a sentiment-index at time t and the value of that index at time t-i for the 3x3strategy, where i = 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. The sentiment 
indices used here are the Construction Confidence Index, the Consumer Confidence Index, the Industrial Confidence Index, the 
Retail Trade Confidence Index and the Economic Confidence Index obtained from OECD and DGEFA. Panel A contains the results 
for UP market states, while panel B for DOWN market states. The first figure in each cell in panels A and B relates to mean returns 
and the figure in square brackets to median returns. Panel C provides results on the equality of the mean returns for the UP and 
DOWN market states assuming equal variances. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6: Momentum Profits and Market States: Raw Returns (pre-2007 crisis) 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 6 x 6 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
2 months 0.0194*** 0.0214*** 0.0814 0.0814 
 [0.0212] [0.0240] [0.0365] [0.0365] 
3 months 0.0210*** 0.0213*** 0.0217** 0.0217** 
 [0.0233] [0.0240] [0.0359] [0.0365] 
4 months 0.0215*** 0.0207*** 0.0016 0.0140 
 [0.0219] [0.0202] [0.0204] [0.0255] 
6 months 0.0226*** 0.0238*** 0.0001 -0.0013 
 [0.0202] [0.0212] [0.0284] [0.0284] 
8 months 0.0200*** 0.0182*** 0.1063 0.0201 
 [0.0226] [0.0193] [0.0359] [0.0353] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
2 months 0.0184* 0.0157* -0.0077 -0.0077 
 [0.0241] [0.0173] [0.0188] [0.0188] 
3 months 0.0152 0.0152* 0.1139 0.1077 
 [0.0197] [0.0156] [0.0156] [0.0180] 
4 months 0.0130 0.0159 0.1993 0.1471 
 [0.0240] [0.0240] [0.0411] [0.0370] 
6 months 0.0086 0.0077 0.1805 0.1573 
 [0.0241] [0.0240] [0.0409] [0.0391] 
8 months 0.0205 0.0231** 0.0312** 0.1865 
 [0.0240] [0.0249] [0.0410] [0.0411] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months 0.0949 0.5651 0.9539 0.9539 
3 months 0.5386 0.5900 0.9699 -0.9189 
4 months 0.7665 0.4759 -2.0009* -1.5884 
6 months 1.2179 1.4525 -1.7409* -1.5828 
8 months -0.0412 -0.4284 0.5531 -1.3496 
 
See notes to table 1 as this table presents the same results as table 1 but for June 1984 - pre-September 2007 (i.e. excluding the 
crisis period).  
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Table 7: Momentum Profits and Market States: CAPM Returns (pre-2007 crisis) 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 6 x 6 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
2 months 0.0111* 0.0091 -0.0534 -0.0534 
 [0.0091] [0.0080] [0.0299] [0.0299] 
3 months 0.0095 0.0090 0.0040 0.0037 
 [0.0072] [0.0065] [0.0273] [0.0299] 
4 months 0.0090* 0.0099* 0.0252 0.0060 
 [0.0088] [0.0094] [0.0373] [0.0331] 
6 months 0.0075 0.0063 0.0156 0.0152 
 [0.0088] [0.0086] [0.0273] [0.0273] 
8 months 0.0100* 0.0112* -0.0994 -0.0216 
 [0.0088] [0.0091] [0.0026] [0.0110] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
2 months 0.0129 0.0155* 0.0441 0.0441 
 [0.0057] [0.0106] [0.0275] [0.0275] 
3 months 0.0162 0.0164* -0.0719 -0.0663 
 [0.0104] [0.0107] [0.0324] [0.0275] 
4 months 0.0184 0.0153 -0.1563 -0.0998 
 [0.0089] [0.0068] [-0.0210] [-0.0059] 
6 months 0.0230 0.0239* -0.1219 -0.1016 
 [0.0080] [0.0089] [0.0108] [0.0108] 
8 months 0.0107 0.0088 0.0163 -0.1357 
 [0.0050] [0.0044] [-0.0210] [-0.0134] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months -0.1753 -0.6327 -1.0142 -1.0142 
3 months -0.6285 -0.7075 0.7707 0.7240 
4 months -0.8526 -0.5355 1.7646* 1.2650 
6 months -1.3455 -1.5917 1.2688 1.1173 
8 months -0.0567 0.2124 -0.8496 0.9002 
 
See notes to table 2 as this table presents the same results as table 2 but for June 1984 - pre-September 2007 (i.e. excluding the 
crisis period).  
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Table 8: Momentum Profits and Market States: FF3F Returns (pre-2007 crisis) 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 6 x 6 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
MPt>EMPt,t-i 
UPE 
2 months 0.0074 0.0049 0.0790 0.0790 
 [0.0060] [0.0011] [0.1121] [0.1121] 
3 months 0.0066 0.0061 0.1233*** 0.1278*** 
 [0.0031] [0.0011] [0.1123] [0.1124] 
4 months 0.0065 0.0078 0.1347*** 0.1332*** 
 [0.0078] [0.0084] [0.1124] [0.1124] 
6 months 0.0050 0.0039 0.1308*** 0.1346*** 
 [0.0078] [0.0025] [0.1096] [0.1182] 
8 months 0.0053 0.0062 0.0514 0.1345*** 
 [0.0016] [-0.0019] [0.1069] [0.1124] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
MPt<MPt-1 
DOWN 
MPt<EMPt-1 
DOWNE 
2 months 0.0099 0.0132 0.1650*** 0.1650*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0077] [0.1334] [0.1334] 
3 months 0.0119 0.0122 0.0762 0.07070 
 [0.0049] [0.0060] [0.1909] [0.1807] 
4 months 0.0128 0.0095 0.0290 0.0473 
 [0.0029] [0.0007] [0.2011] [0.1668] 
6 months 0.0161 0.0172 0.0511 0.0553 
 [0.0020] [0.0044] [0.2215] [0.1909] 
8 months 0.0040 0.0030 0.1877*** 0.0220 
 [0.0007] [0.0020] [0.2419] [0.1523] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months -0.2393 -0.8092 -0.9912 -0.9912 
3 months -0.4940 -0.5728 0.5286 0.6528 
4 months -0.5583 -0.1634 1.1153 1.0686 
6 months -0.9491 -1.1817 0.8022 0.8320 
8 months 0.1026 0.2717 -1.0797 0.9528 
 
See notes to table 3 as this table presents the same results as table 3 but for June 1984 - pre-September 2007 (i.e. excluding the 
crisis period).  
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Table 9: Momentum Profits and Investor Sentiment Market States: CAPM Returns (pre-
2007 crisis) 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
Construction 
Up 
Retail 
Up 
Consumer  
Up 
Industrial 
Up 
Sentiment 
Up 
2 months 0.0111* 0.0185** 0.0195*** 0.0093 0.0121 0.0105 
 [0.0091] [0.0145] [0.0125] [0.0094] [0.0099] [0.0104] 
3 months 0.0095 0.0173** 0.0211** 0.0060 0.0101 0.0148** 
 [0.0072] [0.0101] [0.0142] [0.0086] [0.0099] [0.0101] 
4 months 0.0090* 0.0171** 0.0119 0.0047 0.0096 0.0059 
 [0.0088] [0.0124] [0.0106] [0.0080] [0.0099] [0.0088] 
6 months 0.0075 0.0148* 0.0099 -0.0002 0.0084 0.0103 
 [0.0088] [0.0106] [0.0091] [0.0053] [0.0080] [0.0094] 
8 months 0.0100* 0.0143* 0.0064 -0.0015 0.0078 0.0061 
 [0.0088] [0.0099] [0.0080] [0.0033] [0.0080] [0.0072] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-i 
DOWN 
Construction 
Down 
Retail 
Down 
Consumer  
Down 
Industrial 
Down 
Sentiment 
Down 
2 months 0.0129 0.0038 0.0043 0.0145* 0.0113 0.0133* 
 [0.0057] [0.0050] [0.0030] [0.0059] [0.0030] [0.0039] 
3 months 0.0162 0.0059 0.0039 0.0193** 0.0139 0.0060 
 [0.0104] [0.0057] [0.0027] [0.0120] [0.0033] [0.0030] 
4 months 0.0184 0.0051 0.0120 0.0208** 0.0147 0.0179** 
 [0.0089] [0.0030] [0.0044] [0.0145] [0.0033] [0.0098] 
6 months 0.0230 0.0064 0.0137** 0.0257*** 0.0144 0.0130* 
 [0.0080] [0.0027] [0.0065] [0.0157] [0.0112] [0.0045] 
8 months 0.0107 0.0070 0.0164** 0.0280*** 0.0151 0.0170** 
 [0.0050] [0.0030] [0.0098] [0.0168] [0.0112] [0.0127] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months -0.1753 1.3595 1.5292 -0.5163 0.0732 -0.3374 
3 months -0.6285 1.1189 1.7384* -1.3156 -0.3715 1.0737 
4 months -0.8526 1.1953 -0.0492 -1.6066 -0.4986 -1.2454 
6 months -1.3455 0.8029 -0.3739 -2.6184** -0.5719 -0.2611 
8 months -0.0567 0.7020 -0.9692 -3.0175*** -0.7129 -1.0745 
 
See notes to table 4 as this table presents the same results as table 4 but for June 1984 - pre-September 2007 (i.e. excluding the 
crisis period).  
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Table 10: Momentum Profits and Investor Sentiment Market States: FF3F Returns (pre-
2007 crisis) 
Lags (i) 3 x 3 
Panel A: MPt>MPt-i 
UP 
Construction 
Up 
Retail 
Up 
Consumer  
Up 
Industrial 
Up 
Sentiment 
Up 
2 months 0.0074 0.0156* 0.0168** 0.0057 0.0088 0.0074 
 [0.0060] [0.0099] [0.0127] [0.0065] [0.0083] [0.0065] 
3 months 0.0066 0.0147* 0.0176** 0.0034 0.0067 0.0114* 
 [0.0031] [0.0078] [0.0114] [0.0051] [0.0083] [0.0087] 
4 months 0.0065 0.0150* 0.0080 0.0021 0.0066 0.0030 
 [0.0078] [0.0113] [0.0079] [0.0038] [0.0083] [0.0064] 
6 months 0.0050 0.0125 0.0074 -0.0023 0.0056 0.0078 
 [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0077] [0.0015] [0.0038] [0.0064] 
8 months 0.0053 0.0120 0.0031 -0.0026 0.0045 0.0030 
 [0.0016] [0.0078] [0.0038] [-0.0006] [0.0020] [0.0015] 
Panel B: MPt<MPt-i 
DOWN 
Construction 
Down 
Retail 
Down 
Consumer  
Down 
Industrial 
Down 
Sentiment 
Down 
2 months 0.0099 0.0000 0.0003 0.0113 0.0079 0.0095 
 [0.0037] [-0.0012] [-0.0033] [0.0031] [-0.0012] [0.0031] 
3 months 0.0119 0.0018 0.0006 0.0150* 0.0107 0.0027 
 [0.0049] [-0.0019] [-0.0019] [0.0048] [-0.0006] [-0.0012] 
4 months 0.0128 0.0000 0.0088 0.0166* 0.0110 0.0142* 
 [0.0029] [-0.0050] [-0.0006] [0.0069] [-0.0006] [0.0037] 
6 months 0.0161 0.0011 0.0093 0.0210** 0.0108 0.0089 
 [0.0020] [-0.0048] [0.0025] [0.0079] [0.0060] [0.0031] 
8 months 0.0040 0.0016 0.0129* 0.0220*** 0.0120* 0.0137** 
 [0.0007] [-0.0056] [0.0060] [0.0082] [0.0079] [0.0078] 
Panel C:    Test for mean equality: (up-down) = 0 
2 months -0.2393 1.4241 1.6456 -0.5495 0.0880 -0.2481 
3 months -0.4940 1.2429 1.6846* -1.1356 -0.3800 1.0520 
4 months -0.5583 1.4789 -0.1009 -1.4172 -0.4303 -1.1559 
6 months -0.9491 1.0871 -0.1866 -2.3015** -0.4824 -0.1102 
8 months 0.1026 0.9844 -0.9388 -2.4290** -0.7249 -1.0377 
 
See notes to table 5 as this table presents the same results as table 5 but for June 1984 - pre-September 2007 (i.e. excluding the 
crisis period).  
 
